Our self-conception derives mostly from our own experience. We believe ourselves to be conscious, rational, social, ethical, language-using, political agents who possess free will. Yet we know we exist in a universe that consists of mindless, meaningless, unfree, nonrational, brute physical partiContinue
Our self-conception derives mostly from our own experience. We believe ourselves to be conscious, rational, social, ethical, language-using, political agents who possess free will. Yet we know we exist in a universe that consists of mindless, meaningless, unfree, nonrational, brute physical particles. How can we resolve the conflict between these two visions?
In Freedom and Neurobiology, the philosopher John Searle discusses the possibility of free will within the context of contemporary neurobiology. He begins by explaining the relationship between human reality and the more fundamental reality as described by physics and chemistry. Then he proposes a neurobiological resolution to the problem by demonstrating how various conceptions of free will have different consequences for the neurobiology of consciousness.
In the second half of the book, Searle applies his theory of social reality to the problem of political power, explaining the role of language in the formation of our political reality. The institutional structures that organize, empower, and regulate our lives-money, property, marriage, government-consist in the assignment and collective acceptance of certain statuses to objects and people. Whether it is the president of the United States, a twenty-dollar bill, or private property, these entities perform functions as determined by their status in our institutional reality. Searle focuses on the political powers that exist within these systems of status functions and the way in which language constitutes them.
Searle argues that consciousness and rationality are crucial to our existence and that they are the result of the biological evolution of our species. He addresses the problem of free will within the context of a neurobiological conception of consciousness and rationality, and he addresses the problem of political power within the context of this analysis.
A clear and concise contribution to the free-will debate and the study of cognition, Freedom and Neurobiology is essential reading for students and scholars of the philosophy of mind.
Loong5 
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Freedom and Neurobiology—Reflections on Free Will, Language, and Political Power
I find the definition from Searle very convincing.
The thesis of determinism asserts that all actions are preceded by sufficient causal conditions that determine them. The thesis of free will asserts that some actions are not preceded by sufficient causal conditions. Free will so defined is th ... (continue)
I find the definition from Searle very convincing.
The thesis of determinism asserts that all actions are preceded by sufficient causal conditions that determine them. The thesis of free will asserts that some actions are not preceded by sufficient causal conditions. Free will so defined is the negation of determinism. (Searle 2007: 47)
From the graph and the definition, we can see that Searle does not hold a compatiblist approach. He just says that we cannot use the form “A caused B” (which is for third-person ontology) to describe the first-person conscious experience, which is in the form “a rational self S performed act A, and in performing A, S acted on reason R).
In the language of neurobiology, the formulation of free will is like this:
If the state of his brain at t1 is not causally sufficient to determine the subsequent states of his brain up to t2, then, given certain assumption about consciousness that I need to make clear, he does have free will. (Searle 2007: 61).
More precisely, free will is a phenomenon in time, if it exists at all. It means that “at any instant the total state of consciousness is fixed by the behavior of the neurons, but from one instant to the next the total state of the system is not causally sufficient to determine the next state”. (Searle 2007:65)
Searle purposes two hypotheses. The first hypothesis is epiphenomenalism. It fits our neurobiological knowledge. However, it is unattractive as it believes that our conception of having free will is illusionary. The second hypothesis is more complex. From premise 1 that all indeterminism in nature is quantum indeterminism and premise 2 that consciousness is a feature of nature that manifests indeterminism, we have the conclusion that consciousness manifests quantum indeterminism. This means the “gaps” in the above graph is filled by quantum randomness. However, randomness at micro level does not by itself imply randomness at the system level. It seems clear enough.
After his formulation, the problem of free will is largely reduced to something that leaves for the work of neuroscientist. I believe that his theory is another form of physicalism.
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