Why do countries differ so greatly in their patterns of political cleavage and coalition? Extending some basic findings of economic theories of international trade, Ronald Rogowski suggests a startling new answer. Testing his hypothesis chiefly against the evidence of the last century and a half, but extending it also to the ancient world and the sixteenth century, he finds a surprising degree of confirmation and some intriguing exceptions....Continua
(2)The frustration of trade can change the relative power leverage of the social classes. The increasing trade harmed the benefit of the domestic owners of the scarce assets. On the contrary, the declining trade damaged the political power of the domestic owners of abundant-assets.
Therefore, the political coalitions of social classes can be linked with the trade development and policy preference.
Rogowski also mentioned about the "developmental state" puzzle: why did some developing countries form strong state that adopted the export-oriented policy? His answer is that they are labor-abundant. The coalition of capitalist and landlord is pro-protectionism, which can be only beat by a strong state (p.163-165).
The critics:Paul Midford 1993. "International Trade and Domestic Politics: Improving on Rogowski's Model of Political Alignments." International Organization, 47, 4: 535-564....Continua