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Naming and Necessity

By Saul A. Kripke

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| Paperback | 9780674598461

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Book Description

If there is such a thing as essential reading in metaphysics or in philosophy of language, this is it.

Ever since the publication of its original version, Naming and Necessity has had great and increasing influence. It redirected philosophical attention to neglected questions o Continue

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This book revolutionized logic studies by opposing Frege and Russell's descriptivist views on naming and reference. If you are interested in the philosophy of logic as it relates to natural language or the philosophy of language, then your education will be incomplete without this book, which, incid ... (continue)

This book revolutionized logic studies by opposing Frege and Russell's descriptivist views on naming and reference. If you are interested in the philosophy of logic as it relates to natural language or the philosophy of language, then your education will be incomplete without this book, which, incidentally, is transcribed from four lectures given entirely without notes.

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uberkuh said on Apr 8, 2006 | Add your feedback

With three powerful arguments Kripke knocks Russell's Description Theory of Meaning down, and the failure of Russell's theory weakens the power of the Descriptivists' explanation on reference.
However this is not the end of the story. The modal argument against theory of description reveals i ... (continue)

With three powerful arguments Kripke knocks Russell's Description Theory of Meaning down, and the failure of Russell's theory weakens the power of the Descriptivists' explanation on reference.
However this is not the end of the story. The modal argument against theory of description reveals its absurd implication on possible world, the descriptivists' idea turns the non-trival statements into necessary truth, and more seriously, it made accidental properties becoming essential properties, and giving a very bad solution to the problem of trans-world identity.
Kripke proposed that proper names are rigid designators and refering the same thing in all possible worlds. This simple and natural proposal, however, has denied the Kantian conception on "a prior"/ "a posterior" and "necessary"/"contingent", as Kant presupposed that "a prior" is equivalent to "necessary", and "a posterior" is equivalent to "contingent", and the denial implies that most of the scientific identity statements, such as "water is H2O", are indeed necessary truths.
That's why this book turns the whole analytic philosophy up side down.

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GermanKong said on Apr 11, 2007 | Add your feedback