How are we able to understand and anticipate each other in everyday life, in our daily interactions? Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, asserts Daniel Dennett in this first full-scale presentation How are we able to understand and anticipate each other in everyday life, in our daily interactions? Through the use of such "folk" concepts as belief, desire, intention, and expectation, asserts Daniel Dennett in this first full-scale presentation of a theory of intentionality that he has been developing for almost twenty years. We adopt a stance, he argues, a predictive strategy of interpretation that presupposes the rationality of the people - or other entities - we are hoping to understand and predict.These principles of radical interpretation have far-reaching implications for the metaphysical and scientific status of the processes referred to by the everday terms of folk psychology and their corresponding terms in cognitive science.While Dennett's philosophical stance has been steadfast over the years, his views have undergone successive enrichments, refinements, and extensions. The Intentional Stance brings together both previously published and original material: four of the book's ten chapters - its first and the final three - appear here for the first time and push the theory into surprising new territory. The remaining six were published earlier in the 1980s but were not easily accessible; each is followed by a reflection - an essay reconsidering and extending the claims of the earlier work. These reflections and the new chapters represent the vanguard of Dennett's thought. They reveal fresh lines of inquiry into fundamental issues in psychology, artificial intelligence, and evolutionary theory as well as traditional issues in the philosophy of mind.Daniel C. Dennett is Distinguished Arts and Sciences Professor at Tufts University and the author of Brainstorms and Elbow Room. The Intentional Stance, along with these works, is a Bradford Book. ...Continua Nascondi
We are artifacts, in effect, designed over the eons as survival machines for genes that cannot act swiftly and informedly in their own interests. Our interests as we conceive them and the interests of our genes may well diverge — even though wereWe are artifacts, in effect, designed over the eons as survival machines for genes that cannot act swiftly and informedly in their own interests. Our interests as we conceive them and the interests of our genes may well diverge — even though were it not for our genes' interests, we would not exist: their preservation is our original raison d'etre, even if we can learn to ignore that goal and devise our own sutnmum bonum, thanks to the intelligence our genes have installed in us. So our intentionality is derived from the intentionality of our "selfish" genes! They are the Unmeant Meaners, not us!...Continua Nascondi
If we cling to the view that "no artifact, no matter how much AI wizardry is designed into it, has anything but derived intentionality", the conclusion forced upon us is that our own intentionality is exactly like that of the robot
Sentences attributing intentional states or events to systems use idioms that exhibit referential opacity: they introduce clauses in which the normal, permissive, substitution rule does not hold. This rule is simply the logical codification of theSentences attributing intentional states or events to systems use idioms that exhibit referential opacity: they introduce clauses in which the normal, permissive, substitution rule does not hold. This rule is simply the logical codification of the maxim that a rose by any other name would smell as sweet. If you have a true sentence, so runs the rule, and you alter it by replacing a term in it by another, different term that still refers to exactly the same thing or things, the new sentence will also be true. Ditto for false sentences — merely changing the means of picking out the objects of the sentence is about cannot turn a falsehood into a truth. For instance, suppose Bill is the oldest kid in class; then if it is true that
(1) Mary is sitting next to Bill,
then, substituting "the oldest kid in class" for "Bill," we get
(2) Mary is sitting next to the oldest kid in class,
which must be true if the other sentence is.
A sentence with an intentional idiom in it, however, contains a clause in which such substitution can turn truth into falsehood and vice versa. (This phenomenon is called referential opacity because the terms in such clauses are shielded or insulated by a barrier to logical analysis, which normally "sees through" the terms to the world the terms are about.) For example, Sir Walter Scott wrote Waverly, and Bertrand Russell (1905) assures us
(3) George IV wondered whether Scott was the author of Waverly,
but it seems unlikely indeed that
(4) George IV wondered whether Scott was Scott.
(As Russell remarks, "An interest in the law of identity can hardly be attributed to the first gentleman of Europe." [1905, p. 485]) To give another example, suppose we decide it is true that
(5) Burgess fears that the creature rustling in the bush is a python
and suppose that in fact the creature in the bush is Robert Seyfarth. We will not want to draw the conclusion that
(6) Burgess fears that Robert Seyfarth is a python.
Well, in one sense we do, you say, and in one sense we also want to insist that, oddly enough, King George was wondering whether Scott was Scott. But that's not how he put it to himself, and that's not how Burgess conceived of the creature in the bush, either — that is, as Seyfarth. It's the sense of conceiving as, seeing as, thinking of as that the intentional idioms focus on....Continua Nascondi
we can rely on a marked set of idioms to have this special feature of being sensitive to the means of reference used in the clauses they introduce. The most familiar of such idioms are "believes that," "knows that," "expects (that)," "wants (it to be the case that)," "recognizes (that)," "understands (that)."